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Abstract 
 
Benjamin Franklin once said that ‘In this world, nothing is certain but death and taxes’ 
and a significant body of the scientific literature including the IPCC have indicated that 
the climate change problem has become such a pressing i ue that we now face a stark 
choice between the premature death of hundreds of millions of the people on this planet 
(from storm, flood, starvation, war or pestilence) and the use of taxation or other financial 
strategies to change the relative cost of carbon intensive sources of energy compared to 
the cost of ‘green’ sources of energy. A change in the relative cost of ‘green energy’ will 
not itself solve the problem, but it is a necessary (though not sufficient) step if there is to 
be the required behavioural change which will support the application of engineering 
solutions to the problem which has been signaled by a large group of climate scientists.  
 
This paper addresses possible approaches to solving the problem of climate change by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGEs). It considers the European Union’s 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) as an example of a market and government failure to 
achieve a reduction in emissions through a neoliberal approach to pricing emissions. The 
discussion then focuses on the design features of a carbon tax and some alternative policy 
instruments that could contribute to a solution to the problem and it raises the main 
advantages of a carbon tax over an ETS.   
  
Introduction 
 
In recent years the build-up of carbon in the atmosphere has been recognized as a major 
environmental problem which is likely to lead to global warming, with a range of 
negative long-term impacts upon the atmosphere of the planet. There seems to be a 
consensus that urgent action is necessary to curb the uild-up of carbon in the atmosphere 
but no global consensus on the urgency of the action required and the best way to deal 
with this problem. In this paper we recognize the key roles of science and technology in 
relation to the problem, as science has identified the problem and the solution lies in 
developing and sharing alternative technology. But a key requirement is for behavioural 
change, as people and businesses will have to change their energy sources from those 
currently dominated by carbon fuels to alternative ‘gr en energy’ sources over time and 
this can be facilitated by a price signal. The cost of carbon-based energy must be changed 
to reflect its full cost (including its environmental damage) and there are three main 
policy instruments available to governments for imposing a price on greenhouse 
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emissions. One popular approach is based on a cap-and tr de system, such as the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and proposed in the Australian 
Carbon Pollution Reduction scheme (CPRS). This approach imposes a quantity cap on 
emissions and expects the resulting scarcity to create a market determined price for 
emissions. A second approach would levy a charge directly upon polluters through a 
carbon tax or an emissions fee, this approach directly imposes a price upon emissions and 
expects the cost increase to reduce demand which will reduce the quantity of emissions 
indirectly. A third approach would regulate emissions directly through pollution controls, 
renewable energy requirements or other controls, directly reducing emissions by 
requiring action by polluting industries to reduce th ir emissions. 
 
For a long time economists and accountants have been aware of the externalities of 
modern industrial society. This is an important case of market failure whereby business 
acts within a market so as to affect people outside the market and such an event is 
unlikely to produce outcomes which involve the most efficient use of resources. Since the 
industrial revolution business has operated in an environment where it did not bear the 
full cost of production because of its capacity to externalize some of its costs through the 
pollution of air, soil and water. In the early days of the industrial revolution most of the 
costs of pollution were borne by the community and over time some of these costs have 
been returned to business through a range of pollution control regulations which forced 
business to clean up some of the environmental damage that was a result of production or 
to bear the cost of installing various pollution contr l devices. The first step in requiring a 
reduction in emissions thus arose from direct regulation of business pollution. 
 
Many governments seem to have accepted the need to imp se a price upon carbon 
emissions into the atmosphere as the way to generate a market-based adjustment to the 
relative cost of various sources of energy. But thedeveloping consensus in most 
developed countries in favour of a ‘cap and trade’ system (an emissions trading system or 
ETS) to produce a market adjustment may not be the best way to deal with the present 
problem of global warming. It could adjust relative prices over time so as to produce a 
long-term result which is favourable to the environment, but it may act too slowly and 
uncertainly to have the desired result. It may also be too difficult for the developing 
countries, which are becoming more important polluters, to put an ETS in place, because 
they lack the relevant control instruments and accounting structures to measure emissions 
and to enforce compliance. The European Union’s attemp  to put in place a ‘cap and 
trade’ system should be a warning to all as it started well but almost collapsed because of 
the lack of transparency in reporting emissions from industries in certain countries and 
the range of exclusions from the trading base.. This eventually produced huge 
fluctuations in the carbon price from time to time and a limited overall impact on 
emissions, with the latest example being 2008 emission  which were 145m tonnes above 
the cap (Carbon Market Data, 2009).  
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
 
In January 2005 the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emi sions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) commenced operation as the largest multi-country, multi-sector greenhouse gas 
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emissions trading scheme worldwide. In the first phase of the scheme a limited number 
and type of installation was to be involved and it was to be restricted to the monitoring 
and control of CO2 only. Some 12,000 installations covering energy activities, 
production and processing of ferrous metals, the mineral industry and pulp, paper and 
board activities were covered by Phase 1 of the EU ETS.  
 
 Under the EU ETS the specified large emitters of greenhouse gases must monitor and 
report their CO2 emissions. In order to ensure thatre l reductions in CO2 emissions 
occurred EU governments were to ensure that the total amount of allowances issued to 
installations was less than the amount of CO2 that would have been emitted under a 
predicted scenario of normal business operations. Each member state was able to allocate 
a quantity of certificates as set down in the Member State National Allocation Plan.  
 
The scheme allows a regulated entity to use a carbon credit to comply with its obligations 
to return an amount of emissions allowances to the government which is equivalent to the 
amount of the installation’s emissions into the atmosphere during the year. The 
installations subject to this scheme may get the allow nces free from their government, 
and it was expected that the various governments would ffer credits equivalent to at 
least 95% of expected emissions, with trading in a m ximum of 5% of emissions. 
Installations were expected to purchase extra credits from other installations or traders 
and to be able to sell any excess allowances that they accumulated to anybody on the 
open market. A regulated entity could acquire carbon credits from any carbon reduction 
project that was certified as eligible to issue carbon credits by the host government or the 
Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board of the EU. 
 
Experience over the past few years has shown that European governments were guilty of 
allowing their industries as much carbon dioxide as they could emit at little or no cost. 
Recently released data from the European Commission sh ws that most member states 
granted their industries carbon emission allowances which were far too generous in the 
period 2005-07, and that this resulted in the virtual collapse of the carbon market in 2007 
and an overall increase in emissions over the initial period. Published figures now show 
that actual emissions from installations covered by the EU ETS in 2005 were several 
million tonnes below the granted permits. This distorted the market and undermined the 
credibility of the emissions trading scheme.  
 
In the first year of operation of the EU ETS some 360 million tonnes of CO2 were traded 
for a total sum of 7.2 billion Euros. During the first year the price of emissions increased 
steadily to reach a peak of 30 Euros per tonne in April 2006, but this price began to fall 
rapidly soon after as it became clear that many countries had given their industries such 
generous emission caps that industry did not need to reduce emissions. This created a 
crisis of confidence in the scheme and CO2 prices fell rapidly over the next year to a 
trading price of 1.2 Euros per tonne in March 2007. The price eventually declined to 0.10 
Euros per tonne by September 2007, which discredited th  market and caused calls from 
many NGOs for more stringent restrictions on CO2 and tighter allocations of emission 
credits in the second phase of the scheme.  
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The second phase of the EU scheme has begun and they are confident of not repeating the 
mistakes of the first phase. The allowances are said to be tighter and the scheme will 
include more greenhouse polluters, including the airline industry. It appears that a 
secondary market has developed, whereby a financial i termediary will accept the risk of 
guaranteed delivery of a EUA for a price around 18 Euros. It is clear that a profitable 
industry may develop around the acquisition and sale of permits and a number of exotic 
financial instruments have been developed to facilit te this, but the profits from this 
activity will go to traders and entrepreneurs who use the system to make money while 
having no commitment to greenhouse gas reductions and this may drain resources from 
the greenhouse gas abatement activity. It also means th t there will not be enough money 
to compensate lower income groups for the cost of their contribution to greenhouse gas 
abatement.  
 
Some recent evidence indicates that the price of a European Union Allowance (EUA) 
rose to a high of €37 in July 2008 and that this prce fell below €9 recently as a result of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a further warning of the volatility of markets. This sort 
of price volatility is bad for business planning and management, though good for 
speculators and indicates the failure of an ETS to sa isfy the real needs of all parties to the 
system.  
 
The North American Acid Rain Program 
 
The 1990 US Title IV SO2 Cap was a successful attempt to limit emissions using a market 
mechanism and is described as “riding on the coat tails of the earlier lead-in-gasoline and 
CFC trading programs” (Smith, 2007, p 3). This scheme only affected emissions from 
coal-fired electricity generators and was relatively asy to manage and monitor. Despite 
the narrow focus of this market, prices for emission  permits “have varied from a low of 
$70 in 1996 to $1500 per ton in 2005” (Nordhaus, 2005, p 15) and Smith observed that 
prices varied from $400 per ton to $1500 per ton in 1996 alone (Smith, 2007, p3). Smith 
also suggested that such fluctuations in the SO2 price meant that costs added to the 
affected energy suppliers “vary between 7 percent and 26 percent of its base operating 
cost” (Smith, 2007, p 3). She then argued that the “(v)ariation of CO2 prices, such as 
those observed in the EU ETS market over the past two years (approximately $2/ton to 
$35/ton), would cause all coal-fired units to see additional costs varying between about 
10 percent and 175 percent of their base operating costs” (Smith, 2007, p 4).  
 
Such price fluctuations would impose a huge burden on the management of electricity 
suppliers and “would be extremely undesirable, particularly for an input (carbon) whose 
aggregate costs might be as great as petroleum in the coming decades.” (Nordhaus, 2005, 
p 15). These price fluctuations in the SO2 trading scheme have arisen despite the findings 
of Ellerman et al that “the temporal efficiency of SO2 allowance banking are both 
reassuring and surprising” (Ellerman et al (2002) p3), though “not necessarily efficient 
in any exact sense” (Ellerman et al (2002) p 24).  
 
The success of the Title IV program in reducing acid rain can be contrasted with the 
abject failure of the Regional Clean Air Emissions Market (RECLAIM) in Southern 
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California. This emissions trading initiative was launched in 1994, targeting SO2 and 
NOx emissions, and it allowed a range of trading, icluding swaps between stationary 
and mobile sources of emissions (Green et al, 2007). “RECLAIM never came close to 
operating as predicted, and was substantially abandoned in 2001. Between 1994 and 
1999, NOx fell only 3 percent, compared to a 13 percent reduction in the five year period 
before RECLAIM.” (Green et al, 2007, p.3). The evidence from these markets is of some 
success in reducing emissions, but the successes have been mixed, resulting from 
differences in approach and in design and enforcement of the various systems, as argued 
by Ellerman et al, (2000, p321). These arguments include: the small number of relatively 
large sources of SO2: design problems must be solved; the operation of the US Acid Rain 
Program was complicated and “(t)here is a potentially l rge distance between embracing 
emissions trading in principle and producing a detailed program that will perform well in 
practice” Ellerman et al, (2000, p321).  
 
A Carbon Tax or Charge on Polluters 
        
In economic terms a carbon tax and an ETS are virtually identical, both aim to raise the 
price of carbon, either directly through a tax impost r indirectly through a cap on the 
quantity of emissions which aims to create an artificial scarcity. Thus, it would seem 
logical to impose a tax on carbon emissions, as this would be simpler and more certain in 
impact than an ETS. Political fear of introducing a new tax seems to be the major 
explanation for government decisions to adopt an ETS, though the most prominent 
argument in favour of an ETS is that the economic cost would be lower from an ETS 
because those firms with a lower marginal cost of abatement would have an incentive to 
do so. Though there is no evidence to support this assertion at this time it is obvious that 
the same incentives would exist in the case of a carbon tax, firms would reduce their tax 
if they abated their pollution and all firms would have the same incentive not just those 
with a low marginal cost of abatement. 
 
There is a large body of literature in economics comparing a carbon tax and an ETS and a 
survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal indicated that most economists favoured 
some form of carbon tax (Green et al, 2007, p 4). Also, the Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia (CEDA) has recently published a report which includes a 
number of papers from economists who favour a carbon tax (CEDA, 2009). Further, 
Professor Gregory Mankiew of Harvard (former chair of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisers under the Bush Administration) operates a web site entitled the Pigou 
Club, which includes the names of a very large number of economists and public figures 
who favour a carbon tax. So there is a large body of inf rmed opinion in support of a 
carbon tax yet the public debate has been dominated by the ETS alternative. 
 
The big advantages of a carbon tax over an ETS are th t the tax would be simpler to 
administer, more economically efficient, more transparent and more visible (and thus 
harder to evade or avoid) and the revenue would flow t  an accountable government 
which would be able to use the extra funds for a socially useful purpose such as providing 
access to ‘green’ energy for low income households and to fund green energy sources. 
Much of the revenue under an ETS would flow to a range of market participants who 
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were motivated solely by their economic interests and who would be encouraged to 
develop a range of exotic market instruments with uncertain economic and environmental 
consequences over time. The evidence from Europe is that the secondary market for 
carbon permits and related derivatives was not large enough or well-informed enough to 
operate efficiently. There have been wide price fluctuations as a particular piece of 
information has reached the market. Short-run over-reactions to particular information 
triggers are common in markets, but in an efficient market there are a range of 
information sources for the market, and in such a situation the market is less likely to be 
surprised by a particular announcement. 
 
The design of a carbon tax is likely to be much simpler than that of an ETS if the aim is 
to change the relative price of generating carbon into the atmosphere as a way of reducing 
the volume of greenhouse gases, because a carbon tax will change the price of carbon-
based energy by a specified and predictable amount. In contrast an ETS aims to change 
the price of greenhouse gases indirectly by specifying a fixed quantity of such gases that 
can be generated in total, creating an artificial sc rcity which will give carbon credits a 
price determined by market trading. The market price of carbon credits will impose a cost 
upon those firms that need to buy the credits and this will be reflected in their cost 
structure, but the price will change as market conditions change and this volatility will be 
used by market traders for their own advantage. As any economist knows it is possible to 
control the price of a commodity or the volume sold but not both, unless you are a 
monopolist selling an essential commodity. Price volatility such as described by Dr Anne 
Smith above ($2/ton to $35/ton) could have a disastrou  impact on the cost structure of 
energy utilities.  This would be enough to create a costing and pricing disaster for coal-
fired energy utilities with completely unpredictable consequences for the solvency of the 
energy suppliers and the continuity of energy supply.   
  
Business would face greater certainty under a carbon tax because the cost increase would 
be specified by the tax rate. The tax could start at a low level, equivalent to say $10 per 
tonne of carbon, which is generally agreed to be too low to have a significant impact on 
business costs and is unlikely to drive investment d cisions. If accompanied by a ten year 
plan to slowly increase the tax this would signal a c ear government intention to steadily 
raise the cost of carbon through tax increases overa specified number of years, which 
would allow business to adjust to a steady change i price. This could be structured in 
such a way as to make it easy for business to adjust to a changing price for carbon and the 
tax rate change would only be one part of the change i  total business cost. This is in 
contrast to the price determined in a market which will be highly volatile, and the 
volatility will make business budgeting and planning much more difficult while the 
volatility will encourage market speculators to profit from market instability. The revenue 
from a carbon tax will go to the government instead of to a range of private sector market 
players and this revenue could then be used to subsidise ‘clean’ energy alternatives and 
low income households who are most likely to be affcted by an increase in energy prices 
associated with a steadily increasing price for carbon. The extra revenue could also be 
used to remove a number of economically inefficient nuisance taxes, including stamp 
duties, which would improve the overall efficiency of the tax system. 
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To develop a carbon tax we need to consider two key variables, the tax base and the rate. 
Clearly the easiest tax base would be stationery energy suppliers which are large and 
highly visible and which could pass the cost of theax onto both private and business 
users of their energy. This would have a broad enough spread to have a direct impact on 
the quantity of energy demanded and thus the amount f greenhouse gases generated. 
This would encourage energy conservation strategies and the change in relative price of 
the various energy sources (with green energy becoming relatively less expensive 
because it would not bear the carbon tax). The carbon tax base could start with the easy 
targets where evasion and avoidance was least likely, and where satellites could be used 
to monitor compliance, and then move to include a range of other industries. Heavy 
industrial users of energy would provide another identifiable and auditable source of 
emissions, with transport being the most likely target after the stationery energy providers 
and heavy industrial users because it is a significant greenhouse contributor and because 
it would be a relatively simple task to place a carbon tax on aviation and motor fuel.  
 
But perhaps the best feature, in economic efficiency terms, is that a carbon tax could be 
levied upon firms that pollute or upon the consumers of products which generated carbon 
pollution in the production process. A carbon tax upon consumers would operate in the 
same way as the GST and could be administered without any further complications than a 
change in the rate of tax collected through the GST. The tax could then be remitted at the 
border for all exporters in the same way as the GST and this would correct a major 
inequity in the CPRS proposal to compensate some exporters only, those defined as 
energy intensive trade exposed (EITE). Under recent proposals some exporters would 
have been be compensated for the impact of the CPRS by receiving up to 95% of permits 
free, while other exporters  received no compensation and would be forced to bear the 
full cost of compliance with the new system.    
 
Further, in a report to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) 
Access Economics “modelling shows, for the same assumed carbon price… The 
projected decline in welfare, as measured by GNP per tonne of   CO2-e   abated within 
Australia, is smaller for the consumption-based approach than a production-based CPRS 
approach”. The chief executive of CEDA David Byers said in response to the Access 
Economics concept modeling ‘that the CPRS would involve losses of real GDP per 
million tones of abatement about 50% higher than a consumption-based carbon tax”.   
 
 A Carbon Tax for Developing Countries 
 
Perhaps an ETS could be designed which would not be exploited by market operators in 
the developed countries who develop derivative securities based upon carbon credits, but 
experience so far does not provide much evidence in support of this. The experience from 
Europe also points to the need for highly sophisticated accounting and economic 
information to support an ETS. The failure of the EU to manage their system despite the 
presence of a set of sophisticated economic, bureauc atic and political controls over the 
operation of the system should alert all to the cost and difficulty of managing an effective 
ETS. The lesson from Europe is of the failure of their initial ETS because of information 
problems that caused a failure of bureaucratic controls over the system. There was an 
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information failure, a regulatory failure and a market failure which caused the initial 
system to collapse. Information asymmetry is a major pr blem in any market and this is a 
common cause of market failures even when the total qu ntity of information is adequate. 
Markets can be manipulated by ‘insiders’ who have access to superior information to the 
detriment of the main body of market players. 
 
Developing countries do not have the economic and accounting information to make an 
ETS work and market manipulation is likely to produce a range of largely unpredictable 
and dysfunctional consequences. Many developing countries have difficulty in operating 
an effective income tax system1 and raise most government revenue from indirect taxes 
and charges for services. It is often relatively easy for citizens in developing countries to 
move their wealth and income around so as to minimize their direct taxes. In such an 
environment, where the economic and accounting information is not sufficient to operate 
a comprehensive income tax system, it would not be possible to operate an effective ETS 
system. A comprehensive solution to the greenhouse problem is not possible without 
eventually including the large developing countries, pecially China, India and Brazil, 
none of which should be forced to bear the cost of the bureaucracy which will be needed 
for an ETS. However, they will be able to monitor and tax the greenhouse gases emitted 
from stationary power sources and large industrial s tes at relatively little cost using 
satellite technology. The extra revenue that they raise from a carbon tax could then be 
used to compensate lower income people who were likely to be disadvantaged by an 
energy cost increase and any extra revenue could be used to invest in low emissions 
technology.  
 
A carbon tax could be levied on either the consumers of products which contain some 
carbon or on the carbon footprint of those firms which generate carbon in their 
production process.  
A carbon tax could be administered by existing tax institutions and the revenue could be 
used to remove or reduce, existing taxes which distort economic activity, used to 
compensate low and middle-income households affected by the tax or used to develop the 
new technology which is needed to address the current problem. It could be levied on 
production or on consumption of greenhouse pollutants d collected and managed by the 
existing tax authorities and the tax could be remitted at the border for all export industries 
as is done with the GST. Reimbursement of the tax a the border for all exporters will 
also be fairer than a system which nominates some as emissions intensive trade exposed 
(IETE) firms which receive compensation while other xporters do not receive 
compensation, as under the proposed Australian CPRS. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Andrew B. and M. Hughes, (1999), Some Implications f Different Asia-Pacific Tax Regimes, AOTCA 
Technical Reports, Vol 5, December.  
     Bird R. and E Zolt, (2005), The limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 
Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 6, Decembr. 
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Some Other Policy Instruments 
 
There are a range of other policy instruments which could be used to encourage the 
abatement of GHG, ranging from direct limits on pollution, subsidies to GHG abatement 
activities, renewable energy targets, ‘green’ projects like tree planting and sequestration 
of carbon in the soil using biochar. A range of these policy instruments have been applied 
in different contexts with a certain level of success, especially direct government limits 
on pollution but these measures tend to be costly to enforce and to impose unnecessary 
costs on the business subject to the restrictions. Many of these measures are short-term in 
impact and only affect a small section of the community and will not have a long-term 
impact on prices and behaviour and without behavioural change then it will be impossible 
to solve the climate change problem. 
 
Perhaps the policy instrument with the most potential to reduce emissions over time is to 
mandate a level of renewable energy from all energy supply firms such as the Renewable 
Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 as amended. On the face of it this Act requires energy 
suppliers to generate 20% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2020 in Australia 
but it has been compromised by concessions to various interest groups, for example coal 
seam gas (methane) is deemed to be a renewable energy source under the legislation, a 
patent absurdity. Energy suppliers are encouraged to invest in renewable energy sources 
and as they supply power from this source they gainrenewable energy certificates (REC) 
which can be sold on the open market or to their customers, such as the energy retailers, 
who can use the REC to meet their obligations under th  renewable energy target. The 
energy producers must first invest in renewable energy sources before they obtain REC 
and the financing costs of the new investment will be passed on to consumers in due 
course as energy prices rise. The longer term impact of the policy will be to increase the 
volume of energy from renewable sources and the extra investment will cause a rise in 
energy prices which may encourage consumers to cut their energy consumption or 
themselves invest in decentralized energy from photo-v ltaic cells or small wind 
generators or similar, again having the effect of increasing the supply of renewable 
energy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In economic terms, a carbon tax and an ETS are virtually identical as they both aim to 
raise the price of carbon, either directly through a tax impost or indirectly through a cap 
on the quantity of emissions. But a tax on carbon emissions would be simpler and more 
certain to increase the cost of fossil fuels and to have an impact on behaviour than an 
ETS. Political fear of introducing a new tax seems to be the main explanation for the tax 
option not being adopted by many governments, thoug some have argued that a market-
based solution will produce the required change in behaviour at the least cost. 
 
There are several advantages of a carbon tax over an ETS. The impact and incidence of a 
tax would be more certain than with an ETS as the tax could be levied on volume of 
emissions measured objectively by satellite monitoring equipment at a publicly 
announced rate. The impact could be gradual, as a tx can be phased in with scheduled 
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rate adjustments according to an announced timetable in such a way as to give industry 
time to adjust. The tax itself would be stable, in contrast to the price fluctuations that 
have occurred in the largest established ETS market, th  EU ETS and the only ETS 
which was successful in reducing emissions, the US Acid Rain Program. The economic 
effect of a tax would be more certain because the increased cost of emissions would be 
stable. In addition, the revenue would be collected by the government and this would 
facilitate revenue recycling to low income families and GHG abatement projects, or it 
could be used to lower other taxes in a way that increased the equity and efficiency of the 
tax system overall.  
 
There are other likely advantages as well. The instabili y of prices in an ETS market 
would add uncertainty and could adversely impact on investment decisions and the level 
of economic activity in the productive sectors of the economy. With a tax, there would be 
no need for a secondary market for securities or a range of complex derivatives, which 
could distort the flow of revenue and economic activity and which would divert income 
from abatement activities to a small number of market players who were able to exploit 
the market volatility of an ETS. The management of a carbon tax would be simpler than 
an ETS and could become the responsibility of existing institutions – unlike an ETS 
which requires a range of new institutions such as a registry and enforcement body, a 
monitoring authority, and a new trading entity. The integrity of a tax would be far higher 
than an ETS because cap and trade systems are inherntly more exposed to fraud and 
evasion, with much selling of permits which do not reduce emissions elsewhere, and with 
buyers not knowing about this fraud or mistake in such a time frame as to allow 
transactions to be unwound. Overall, an ETS is an artificial market based on a scarcity 
created by a government for an intangible commodity, as it requires a government to 
create an artificial scarcity for the commodity to have value, whereas a carbon tax does 
not require any such economic fiction.  
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